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OCTAVIAN GABOR 
JUSTICE BETWEEN MERCY AND REVENGE IN 
SOPHOCLES’ ANTIGONE AND PLATO’S CRITO 
ABSTRACT: Plato’s Crito and Sophocles’ Antigone challenge the concept of justice as 
“benefitting friends and harming enemies”: justice stems from anger and harms the soul. 
The Antigone first illustrates how violence results from people’s actions when they see 
themselves as the agents of justice; second, it points to a possible reassessment of justice as 
benefitting all, regardless of what others do to you. In the Crito, Socrates shows how this 
new notion of justice, which is very similar to mercy, is consistent with the life of a good 
human being. 
RÉSUMÉ: Le Criton de Platon et l’Antigone de Sophocle mettent en question la notion de 
justice qu’on trouve dans le monde grec: “faire du bien à ses amis, faire du mal à des 
ennemis”. Selon cette définition, la justice provient de la colère et fait du mal à 
l’âme. Antigone montre d’abord que la violence est le résultat des actions des gens quand ils 
se considèrent eux-mêmes comme les agents de la justice. En outre, cette pièce suggère une 
possible redéfinition de la justice, au sens de “faire du bien à tous, indépendamment de ce 
que les autres nous font”. Dans le Criton, Socrate montre comment cette nouvelle notion 
de justice, très similaire à la pitié, est cohérente avec la vie de l’homme bon. 
KEYWORDS: Justice; Mercy; Anger; Philosophy and Tragedy; Classical Studies 
Justice and revenge have a long relationship, and Sophocles’ Antigone and 
Plato’s Crito show how connected they were in the ancient Greek world. 
This cannot come as a surprise since the idea of revenge is deeply rooted in 
human culture. Even today, people are often troubled when they witness 
others who do not react angrily and do not desire revenge when 
Octavian Gabor 
 36 
persecuted.1 The first lines of the Antigone and of the Crito display this 
inability to understand someone who does not desire to harm back one’s 
abuser. Antigone becomes angry when her own sister Ismene refuses to join 
her in Antigone’s attempt to act against the law of Thebes (69-99).2 Crito 
is frustrated with Socrates’ calmness while the latter is imprisoned waiting 
for his execution (43a-46b).3 Antigone and Crito find it natural to harm 
their enemies when they were harmed, and they expect other people to 
have the same reaction. We can recognize here half of the definition of 
justice as it appears in the Republic, in the words of Polemarchus (332d).4 It 
is just to take revenge, because you thus harm the people who have harmed 
you. However, the Antigone and the Crito also bring the germs of a new 
approach to justice: Sophocles and Plato suggest that justice is not the 
return of the equal, but rather the expression of acting beneficently to all, 
regardless of their actions. In Socrates’ words from the Crito, “one should 
never do wrong in return, nor do any man harm, no matter what he may 
have done to you” (49c). 
In the seventh century A.D., so more than a thousand years later, St. 
Isaac of Syria5 had a similar approach. Defining justice as the return of the 
                                                            
1 See M. Nussbaum, Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2016. She mentions the case of a journalist who reacts physically 
to a group of people who, when kicked savagely by the police, do not react: “I felt an 
indefinable sense of helpless rage and loathing, almost as much against the men who were 
submitting unresistingly to being beaten as against the police wielding the clubs” (p. 220). 
Nussbaum also discusses how responding to violence with lack of violence is often 
perceived as an unmanly act. This shows that people believe that, in order to be a real 
‘man’ and thus maintain one’s dignity, a person must show strength and fight against 
persecution. See also G. Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 1991. Vlastos says that “when retaliation is the expected outcome to 
unjust aggression, failure to retaliate will be construed as weakness” (p. 186).  
2 For the Antigone, I use P. Meineck’s and P. Woodruff’s translation in Sophocles, 
Theban Plays, Indianapolis, Cambridge, Hackett Publishing House, 2003. At times, I 
offer my own translations, and I use the following Greek edition: H. Lloyd-Jones, N.G. 
Wilson, Sophoclis fabulae, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, p. 182-238. 
Retrieved from: http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/Iris/Cite?0011:014:0.  
3 For Crito, I used G.M.A. Grube’s translation, in Plato, Complete Works, edited by J. 
M. Cooper, Indianapolis-Cambridge, Hackett Publishing House, 1997. 
4 For a study of the Greek idea of justice, see M. W. Blundell, Helping Friends and 
Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1989. See also Vlastos, Socrates, and S. Goldhill, Reading Greek Tragedy, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986. Godhill says, “An ekhthros […] is the 
opposite of a philos – an ‘enemy’. As much as philos implies positive ties and obligations, 
ekhthros implies equally binding requirements to be disobliging” (p. 83).  
5 Isaac of Syria, or Isaac the Syrian, also known as Isaac of Nineveh, lived during the 
seventh century, BC. 
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equal – a concise phrase that expresses the “benefit your friends, harm your 
enemies” view – Isaac of Syria claims that it has no place in a merciful 
heart, one that benefits all regardless of how people act.  
Mercy and justice in the same soul is like the man who worships God and idols in the 
same temple. Mercy is in contradiction with justice. Justice is the return of the equal 
because it returns to man that which he deserves and it does not bend to one side, 
neither is it partial in the retaliation. But mercy is sorrow that is moved by grace and 
bends to all with sympathy, and it does not return the harm to him who deserves it, 
although it overfills him who deserves good.6 
The perspective of Isaac of Syria, who believes that mercy and justice are 
incompatible, may seem too strong. We may be tempted to say that the 
radical separation between these two notions can only be seen in 
Christianity, with its emphasis on mercy and forgiveness. Thus, we may say 
that such views have no relevance for understanding the world of the 
Greeks. However, the Antigone and the Crito also suggest that justice – 
benefitting friends and harming enemies – cannot belong to the soul of a 
good human being, who never returns evil and who does not harbor anger. 
Still, the Greeks’ solution should not be confused with Christianity: they 
do not completely banish justice from a human soul. Instead, they redefine 
it. In the Antigone, Sophocles points out the connection between justice 
and emotions, especially anger. He also shows the consequences of acting 
according to justice and gives a possible alternative. In the Crito, Plato’s 
Socrates also starts by pointing out the connection between justice and 
emotions. He then goes further and provides a new definition for justice, 
which is very similar to the notion of mercy that we find later in Isaac of 
Syria: do good to all, regardless of how they treat you. 
Writing on Socrates’ rejection of retaliation, Gregory Vlastos points 
out Socrates’ radical change of the morality of his time. He believes that, 
among the few philosophers who do not take the morality into which they 
were born for granted, “Socrates is the greatest. Proceeding entirely from 
within the morality of his own time and place, he nevertheless finds reason 
to stigmatize as unjust one of its most venerable, best established, rules of 
justice”.7 Vlastos writes of the justice of retaliation, a rule of just repayment 
                                                            
6 Isaac the Syrian, The Ascetical Homilies of Saint Isaac the Syrian, translated by the 
Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Boston, 1984, p. 243-244. 
7 Vlastos, Socrates, p. 179. 
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for the suffering one experiences.8 He points out that “the first Greek to 
grasp in full generality this simple and absolutely fundamental moral truth” 
that “if someone has done a nasty thing to me this does not give me the slightest 
moral justification for doing the same nasty thing, or any nasty thing, to him”9 
is Socrates. I propose that, while Socrates is the first to spell it out, we can 
witness the same idea being performed in a tragedy such as the Antigone.10  
Sophocles’ Antigone 
The word φίλος, friend, and its derivatives appear nine times within the first 
99 lines of the Antigone, the length of the dialogue between Antigone and 
her sister Ismene. At the same time, the word ἔχθρος, enemy, and its 
derivatives appear four times, always used by Antigone, who wants justice 
for her brother. The theme of justice as benefitting friends and harming 
enemies is emphasized from the first line, in which Antigone reminds Ismene 
of their communion. Their being together presupposes a relationship of love, 
philia, and interdependence. Ὦ κοινὸν αὐτάδελφον Ἰσμήνης κάρα (1), Antigone 
says, emphasizing to Ismene that they belong together, that they share the 
misfortune that came over them because of the shame that surrounds their 
father, Oedipus. In fact, Antigone’s opening is a clarification of the status of 
their relationships: they are sisters, and since Antigone bases philia on blood 
relations, they are also friends.11 The consequence of this is that they must have 
the same friends and enemies. To make things even clearer, she asks Ismene 
to declare her allegiance, to show where she stands οὕτως ἔχει σοι ταῦτα, καὶ 
δείξεις τάχα/εἴτ’ εὐγενὴς πέφυκας εἴτ’ ἐσθλῶν κακή (37-8). 
Antigone’s approach has shaped Ismene’s reality. Thus, Ismene seems 
to have two options only: to be a friend and thus help Antigone burry her 
brother, just as justice requires, or to be not worthy of her birth, and thus 
place herself outside of the communion that Antigone had assumed. 
Ismene finds herself in a difficult predicament, since neither of the two 
options is in her advantage. Ismene recognizes the stubbornness of her 
                                                            
8 See ibid., p. 180-190, for a detailed assessment of the notion of justice as retaliation 
in the works of Ancient Greek writers.  
9 Ibid., p. 190. 
10 Vlastos, acknowledges that “innovations in history don’t come out of the blue” 
(ibid.), and so he points to examples in Greek literature that anticipate Socrates’ 
perspective. He does not mention the Antigone. After discussing Sophocles’ Ajax, though, 
Vlastos asks, “Has he seen that the talio is a fraud, its justice a delusion? To this we must 
reply that he has not even faced the question” (p. 194).  
11 See Goldhill, Reading, for the discussion of the meaning of philia.  
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sister, calls her on her stubbornness, ὦ σχετλία (47), and tells her what 
happens when someone makes mistakes, reminding her of their father. 
The opening of the play, then, is a dialogue between two characters 
with different attitudes about a wrong they suffered. Antigone and Ismene 
have lost a brother, Polyneices. Creon decreed that his corpse should not be 
honored and be left on the battlefield. Justice triggers in Antigone the 
desire to help her own. Polycines is her brother, and even Ismene’s brother, 
whether she likes it or not: τὸν γοῦν ἐμόν, καὶ τὸν σόν, ἢν σὺ 
μὴ θέλῃς,/ἀδελφόν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ προδοῦσ’ ἁλώσομαι (45-6). Ismene is also called 
to act according to justice. Creon, Antigone continues, cannot separate her 
from what is hers (48). Ismene, however, has a different response. She 
acknowledges the harm, but she refuses to act against it, claiming that it is 
against her feminine nature to do so, even asking the dead for σύγγνοια 
(66), ‘lenient judgment’, perhaps ‘mercy’ or even ‘forgiveness’.12 In other 
words, she steps outside of the requirements imposed on her by justice. 
Audiences are easily persuaded to side with Antigone, a woman who, 
because of a love for a brother, disobeys a law and makes herself an enemy 
of the city. The context, of course, is a bit more complicated. First, 
Polyneices, Antigone’s and Ismene’s brother, had fought against the city 
and thus become its enemy, even if he continues to be a friend for 
Antigone. Second, while considering her brother a friend, Antigone easily 
calls her sister an enemy from the beginning of the play, a quite surprising 
feature for someone who is often portrayed as a defender of love.  
Let me say a few words about these two aspects. First, we see how 
justice depends on personal perspective. In Antigone’s mind, she is 
required to bury her brother’s corpse because it is just to do so: she benefits 
him who, by being a brother, is a friend. Furthermore, her action is right 
also because it harms Antigone’s enemies: by deciding to leave Polyneices’ 
body on the battlefield, Creon has become Antigone’s enemy, and 
disobeying his law means harming him. In Creon’s mind, however, he also 
acts according to justice. From the perspective of the state, Polyneices is an 
enemy because he attacked Thebes. It is thus just to punish him. Creon and 
Antigone, the two ‘enemies’ in Sophocles’ play, share the same definition of 
justice, and none of them falter in applying it, even if both have the 
occasion to reconsider it when Haemon, Creon’s son, and Ismene 
respectively talk to them. Their enmity does not stem from different 
                                                            
12 Meineck’s and Woodruff’s translation render σύγγνοια as forgiveness: “Forgive me, 
I am held back by force” (p. 66). 
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definitions of justice, but rather from differences in judgment regarding 
friends and enemies.  
Second, the difference between Antigone’s attitudes towards her 
brother and sister is hard to explain13 if we consider her a person who is 
true to her family, regardless of what they do. After Ismene refuses to help 
her, Antigone uses the words ‘enemy’ and ‘justice’: 
εἰ ταῦτα λέξεις, ἐχθαρῇ μὲν ἐξ ἐμοῦ, ἐχθρὰ δὲ τῷ θανόντι προσκείσῃ δίκῃ (93-4). 
Because of her answer, Ismene has become an enemy for her sister. But a 
blood relation is supposed to include a relation of philia. The relation 
between the two sisters brings forward a tension between friendship and 
enmity within family. In discussing Electra’s concern about whether it is 
pious to pray for revenge in Choephoroi, Goldhill remarks that “it is in strife 
within the family that the possible tensions in the traditional moral 
position are most clearly seen. At what point can members of one’s own 
family cease to be philos?”14 The switch from philos to ekhthros takes place 
rapidly in the Antigone. A possible explanation of Antigone’s treatment of 
her own sister as enemy is that, as Godlhill remarks in his analysis of 
Oresteia, “It is better to treat all, including your mother, as ekhthros rather 
than the gods”.15 Since Antigone believes that the gods command the 
proper burial of her brother, listening to them is preferable to maintaining 
philia for her sister.  
This account, however, cannot fully explain the dialogue between the 
two sisters. Antigone can well maintain her opinion even if Ismene doesn’t 
agree with her. Whether Ismene helps Antigone or not does not harm her 
sister’s view. Antigone’s immediate, thoughtless, and impulsive rejection of 
her sister must be determined by something more than an apparent 
disagreement between Ismene’s attitude and the gods’ desire. Goldhill 
remarks that in this scene, “it is as if Antigone is implying that even to 
disagree with her attitude towards a philos [in this case, Polyneices] is to 
make one an ekhthros (even though Ismene is a sister as much as Polyneices 
is a brother)”.16 I argue that Antigone’s words are not only a seeming 
implication about how one can become her enemy, but they rather express 
her attitude towards those who disagree with her, regardless of the topic of 
                                                            
13 See also Blundell’s comments about this difference in Helping, p. 111-115. 
14 Goldhill, Reading, p. 84. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., p. 93. 
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disagreement. This is due to Antigone’s self-reliance in matters having to 
do with understanding. 
Goldhill writes about Antigone’s self-reliance in a context in which, 
“in democratic Athens, an essential demand of the ideology of the city is 
the mutual interdependence of citizens”.17 This self-reliance makes her trust 
her own judgment and places her in the position to decide what is just and 
unjust for herself, but also for the others, a feature that brings her in 
company with Creon. Neither of them relies on others, but they rather 
expect those around them to comply to their own view of the world. Those 
who have a different perspective become their enemies. 
In the particular case of the two sisters, Ismene harms Antigone by her 
refusal. Antigone had not perceived she was harmed in Polyneices’ attack 
on the city, so he was never en enemy for her. When Ismene disagrees with 
her, though, the antagonism is direct: it is Antigone’s desire that is disputed 
and also, perhaps, even the possibility of accomplishing her desire as well. 
Antigone did not come to Ismene to give her a chance to express her love 
for her brother, but she came because she needed help. Proper burial rites 
are not the affair of one person alone, especially when the corpse is guarded 
by soldiers. Furthermore, a stubborn person like Antigone – remember 
that Ismene has already pointed that out – wants her deed to be 
proclaimed. Even Ismene’s silence about her action would harm her, so 
Antigone reminds her that if she does not speak about it, she would be 
more of an enemy (86-87). The difference in the attitudes Antigone has 
before her brother and sister do not show inconsistency in Antigone. On 
the contrary, she constantly applies justice by judging who is the enemy and 
who is the friend; this judgment is not in accordance with blood 
connections, but rather with ideological agreement. This suggests that the 
Greek notion of justice is reflexive and it is based on the agent’s interests. 
One benefits friends and harms enemies because one loves oneself.  
In Antigone’s case, the above claim seems to contradict one of her 
most famous lines in the play. During the exchange with Creon, she 
notoriously says that she was born to share love, and not hatred (523). 
These words suggest that she is concerned with others, and that everything 
she does is for their benefit, and not for herself. Nevertheless, we need to 
understand this line in context. It is significant that Antigone’s words 
appear just before her sister joins her on scene. It is as if Sophocles reminds 
his readers and spectators of how Antigone, who just claimed that her 
                                                            
17 Ibid., p. 91. 
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nature is to love and not to hate, treated her own sister when she disagreed 
with her. In fact, Antigone continues to treat her sister the same way, even 
if the chorus introduces Ismene as someone who “sheds tears of sister-love”. 
Ismene pleads with Antigone to not be despised (544), but she cannot 
overcome the wall raised between the two of them by the one who just 
claimed that her nature is to side with love. “I won’t accept a friend who’s 
only friends in words” (543), Antigone says, revealing that her nature is not 
to side with love, as she fools herself to believe, but rather with those whom 
she considers friends – those who agree with her. 
The beginning of Sophocles’ play shows us the potential dangers of the 
notion of justice. First, since it refers to the friends and the enemies of the 
agent, the decision about whether an action is right or wrong depends on 
the personal attitude of the agent toward different people. Second, and 
perhaps more important, its reflexivity makes the agents blind to the 
perspective of another. Whether an action is right or wrong can no longer 
be debated rationally because it inevitably arrives at a fight about one’s ‘true 
colors’, or one’s allegiances to friends. Since people have strong beliefs 
about their friends and enemies, it so happens that, whenever someone acts 
out of justice, he or she cannot be made aware of the irrationality of his or 
her attitude. 
In the Antigone, the character who is similar to Antigone is, in fact, her 
enemy. At first sight, it seems that Sophocles establishes Creon as 
Antigone’s counterpart. Creon denies everything Antigone believes. Their 
disagreement, however, rests in the application of their principles, not in the 
principles themselves. The king of Thebes takes for granted Antigone’s 
definition of justice, benefitting friends and harming enemies. The difference 
results from his understanding of who his enemies and his friends are. Creon 
sees things simply: Polyneices attacked the city, thus he is an enemy. His 
conclusion is as certain as Antigone’s: Polyneices must be punished by 
leaving his corpse to the dogs. 
However, Creon’s first speech, lines 155-210, seems to oppose the 
logic of friendship and to propose ruling the state on the principle of 
obeying the laws. He says that a leader is not good if he places family or 
friends before the state (182-183). We need to consider, though, Creon’s 
position. He is not a philosopher who discusses moral views or criteria for 
good law-makers. He is the new leader of Thebes, the one who gives the 
laws of the city. It is his laws that take precedence over family and friends, 
not any laws. In fact, he shows that he has never abandoned the principle of 
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justice that requires to help friends and harm enemies. At the end of the 
speech, he clarifies what it means to be a friend: it is to be a friend of the 
city. For such a being, Creon is ready to “pay him full honor, in death or 
life” (210). He also warns the men of the chorus that their job is to not side 
with anyone who disobeys his laws (219). The Chorus understands 
Creon’s words just as he meant them. Siding with someone who disobeys 
Creon’s laws makes them his enemies, and this may lead to their death, the 
“reward” (221) for becoming Creon’s opponents. 
Throughout the play Creon shows that he upholds the view of justice 
that requires benefitting friends and harming enemies. When he speaks of 
what the gods prescribe for human beings, he agrees that one must always 
follow what the gods require, but he could not believe that they could care 
in any way about the corpse of an enemy (283-4). The gods themselves, 
Creon suggests, would not go against the principle of human justice. It is 
just to punish one’s enemies. If one harms you, the friendship based on 
family connections is irrelevant. By attacking the city, Polyneices placed 
himself outside of friendship, and it is only just to punish him for that. 
The comparison between Crito and Antigone may seem outstretched. 
The two of them could not be further apart in their actions: Crito accuses; 
Antigone loves and defends. The outcome, however, is different only 
because each one of them has a different understanding of that which is 
loved by the gods; while the actions are different, they have the same 
principle: the certainty concerning what the gods hold dear. In one case, 
the gods hold dear upholding the law. In the other case, the gods hold dear 
doing right by the dead. 
So Creon thinks he knows, as Antigone does, what the gods love.18 He 
also knows what justice means, benefitting friends and harming enemies, 
just as well as Antigone does. But he differs in his judgment about who 
should be considered a friend. There is one more feature that connects 
them: both of them want to impose their understanding of justice on 
others. Antigone pressures Ismene, and her sister’s refusal angers her and 
makes Ismene her enemy: Creon asks that all follow his law, regardless of 
what they think of it. Antigone’s refusal angers him and makes her his 
enemy. Sophocles does not present here a conflict between two ideas or 
two attitudes before the law, but rather between two people who identify 
themselves with the same idea of justice to the point in which they become 
                                                            
18 See also another character in Plato’s dialogues who ‘knows’ what the gods hold 
dear, Euthyphro. 
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its mere expression. Antigone is the being-in-act of justice: benefitting 
friends and harming enemies as expressed in Antigone. Creon is the being-
in-act of justice: benefitting friends and harming enemies as expressed in 
Creon. In fact, two people who have the same definition of justice can be 
enemies because the definition of justice includes personal perspectives 
regarding friends and enemies.  
When two people have the same definition of justice but have 
different friends and enemies, their dialogue is absurd. When Creon and 
Antigone have an exchange of words, none of them is interested in 
understanding the perspective of the other. Creon reminds Antigone that 
ἀλλ’ ἴσθι τοι τὰ σκλήρ’ ἄγαν φρονήματα πίπτειν μάλιστα (473-4) – a quite 
sensible thing to say, unless it was said by someone who himself is rigid. 
Even if both of them make arguments by appealing to the inflexibility of 
the laws of the city or of the gods, their inflexibility has become so in their 
respective minds. Creon and Antigone speak as if they do not hear one 
another.19 In fact, they cannot hear one another, because they do not debate 
a theory. They agree with the theory: benefit your friends and harm your 
enemies. They think they debate justice, but they debate who they are – 
their perspective about friends and enemies. Thus, if they truly engaged in a 
genuine dialogue, they would need to be able to give up not a theory, but 
rather themselves – their own ‘friends and enemies’. None of them do it, so 
the result is a dialogue of the absurd: 
ΚΡ. σὺ τοῦτο μούνη τῶνδε Καδμείων ὁρᾷς. 
ΑΝ. ὁρῶσι χοὖτοι· σοὶ δ’ ὑπίλλουσι στόμα. 
ΚΡ. σὺ δ’ οὐκ ἐπαιδῇ, τῶνδε χωρὶς εἰ φρονεῖς; 
ΑΝ. οὐδὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τοὺς ὁμοσπλάγχνους σέβειν (508-511). 
Antigone tells Creon that the people in Thebes think like her. As if he does 
not hear her, Creon continues his attacks by asking whether she is ashamed 
for having a different view than these people. Instead of just replying with, 
“I just told you that they do not have a mind apart from mine”, Antigone 
applies shame to a different situation, having respect for a brother. But the 
discussion was about shame when one thinks differently than the 
community. Her deafness in regard to Creon’s arguments is similar to his 
own deafness in regard to anyone else who has a different opinion than 
                                                            
19 See also Blundell, Helping, who says, “The narrowness of both is revealed in their 
failure really to engage in argument” (p. 145). For similarities between Creon and 
Antigone, see also B. M. W. Knox, The Heroic Temper. Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1964, especially p. 67-72. 
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him. Their arrogance is of the same nature, although different in its 
particulars. Creon and Antigone are both impatient and quick in judgment 
and in condemning others. They both become the absolute center of their 
own world, their own gods, and judge everything according to their views 
of the world, but this is explainable because they both start with a notion of 
justice that focuses on the individual’s situation in life. Regardless of 
whether we sympathize with one and reject the other, their problems stem 
from the same hamartia – the trust that a human being places in one’s own 
beliefs, a trust required by the notion of justice they have. They must 
believe they are right in regard to friends and enemies; otherwise, they 
would not be able to apply justice. The Antigone can be read as a 
performance of what happens when one misses the mark not in judgment 
(we can distinguish between Creon’s love of hatred and Antigone’s love of 
love and say that one is better than the other), but in establishing one’s 
ideas as the mark itself. In such case, mercy is inevitably absent. People can 
no longer do good to all, regardless of how others may treat them, because 
their first commitment is to themselves, just as the notion of justice 
requires. You cannot love all others and act according to a theory that 
separates the world between friends and enemies. 
There is one more significant encounter in the play that brings further 
evidence about the connection between justice and personal emotions. 
This is the dialogue between Creon and his son Haemon, who was also 
Antigone’s fiancé. The conversation between the two underlines one 
particular aspect of justice, the separation among people as friends and 
enemies, and also suggests a possible alternative: inclusion.  
The structure of their dialogue is similar to the one between the two 
sisters at the beginning of the play. There, Antigone established her friends 
and enemies from the first exchange: “Our enemies are on the march to 
hurt our friends” (10). In a similar fashion, Creon makes it clear to his son 
that they can be friends or enemies. Haemon could have come on behalf of 
his fiancée, so against the law and implicitly his father, or in friendship in 
every respect (631-634). Haemon professes his friendship to his father, just 
as Ismene did toward Antigone. His discourse is inclusive. He does not 
reject his father from the beginning, but he rather listens to him and 
encourages him to listen to others as well. It is good for one man to be born 
complete, Haemon says, but it usually turns out otherwise (721-722). If 
people were complete, then their judgment regarding friends and enemies 
would always be correct. But men do not have complete knowledge. Thus, 
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when someone thinks he is complete, he transforms himself into the very 
principle of justice. 
Everything Haemon says stems out of love. His words and attitudes 
express his willingness to be with his father. πάτερ, σός εἰμι (635). “Father, I 
am yours”. You may have made a mistake, he seems to say, but I am here for 
and with you. “My natural duty’s to look out for you, spot any risk/That 
someone might find fault with what you say or do” (688-689).20 Do not cut 
yourself from all others. I hear “how the entire city is grieving over the girl” 
(693). Do not make a decision solely on your understanding. “Don’t always 
cling to the same disposition,21/Don’t keep saying that this, and nothing 
else, is right./If a man believes that he alone has a sound mind,/And no one 
else can speak or think as well as he does,/Then, when people study him, 
they’ll find an empty book” (705-709). If you make a decision based solely 
on your understanding, then you are alone; you cut yourself from the 
communion with others and you remain with yourself and your law, which 
is nothing but a reflection of yourself. Antigone runs the risk of dying, but 
there is another risk involved: Creon himself can die. Becoming an ‘empty 
book’ is nothing else than no longer being human. He may look like a 
human, walk like a human, but he would no longer be alive in his stiffness.  
Creon does not listen to his son, and the separation continues. 
Haemon is angered himself and ends up committing suicide. But we have 
seen here the possibility of replacing justice with something else: an 
attitude of inclusion which no longer looks for one’s benefits, but rather 
tries to understand another’s views and interests.  
Plato’s Crito 
Plato’s dialogue opens with Crito’s surprise at Socrates’ peaceful sleep.22 
Socrates is rapidly approaching his own death, which brings about unrest 
for most people; but we should also remember that he is entitled, at least 
                                                            
20 P. Meineck’s and P. Woodruff’s translation captures well the meaning of 
Haemon’s and Creon’s interactions, and so I chose to use it for the exchange between the 
two. 
21 Meineck and Woodruff, whose translation I used, choose to write ‘anger’ here. 
While the Greek text does not have anger, but ἦθος, so character, mood, or disposition, 
their choice is significant here, further emphasizing that the decisions about justice are, in 
fact, influenced by people’s emotions. 
22 For a discussion on Crito’s alleged ‘emotional distraction,’ see M. C. Stokes, Dialectic 
in Action: An Examination of Plato’s Crito, Swansea, The Classical Press of Wales, 2005, p. 
27-29. 
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from a human perspective, to be angry, for he has been wronged without 
having done anything bad. The laws of Athens, or at least their application, 
sent him to prison to wait for his execution. Socrates, however, remains 
calm;23 the structure of the dialogue does not suggest that his calmness is 
the effect of a decision or that it comes out of rational calculation. Instead, 
as Crito says it, it seems to be the continuation of a state that is quite 
natural for Socrates: “Often in the past throughout my life, I have 
considered the way you live happy, and especially so now that you bear your 
present misfortune so easily and lightly” (43b). 
It is at this moment that Plato provides an interesting dramatic 
element: Socrates’ dream. He tells Crito that it was good to let him sleep 
because he could thus complete his dream: “a beautiful and comely woman 
dressed in white approached me. She called me and said: ‘Socrates, may you 
arrive at fertile Phthia on the third day’” (44a-b). Both Crito and Socrates 
seem to understand the dream,24 although no clear interpretation is 
provided in the text. The usual account is that Socrates believes that he 
would die, and so his soul would find its home, on the third day. In the 
context, this interpretation seems plausible. Crito believes that Socrates 
would be dying the second day, since his execution is scheduled the day 
after the ship from Delos returns. But Socrates believes that the timing for 
his death is not accurate and provides his dream as proof (43c-44b). 
This Homeric line about the return to Phthia is charged, I propose, 
with more meaning. In Book 9 of the Iliad, it comes up at an important 
moment. Achilles had been harmed by Agamemnon, and his decision to go 
home is not a peaceful one. In fact, Achilles seems to be the type of 
character that feels at home on the battlefield, where he has made a name 
for himself and where he hopes to achieve immortality by remaining in the 
memory of his people. Now, he leaves Troy in anger. He has refused all gifts 
Agamemnon had sent to appease him, and he tells the messengers, “So 
report back to him everything I say,/And report it publicly25 – get the 
                                                            
23 See also S. Halliwell’s discussion on “the virtuous man’s annulment of suffering 
and grief” (p. 127) in Plato’s dialogues. S. Halliwell, “Plato and Aristotle on Denial of 
Tragedy,” in A. Laird (ed.), Oxford Readings in Ancient Literary Criticism, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2006. 
24 Whether Crito and Socrates truly interpret the dream in the same way remains 
unclear. See Stokes’ comments (n. 27 below) about the fact that Phthia is in Thessaly, 
where Crito believes that Socrates may want to move (45c). 
25 Achilles’s desire to have this report made public mirrors Antigone’s request to 
have her own deed public, when she tells Ismene she should not be silent about it, unless 
she wants to be more of an enemy to her. 
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Greeks angry,/In case the shameless bastard still thinks/He can steal us 
blind. He doesn’t dare/Show his dogface here. Fine. I don’t want/To have 
anything to do with him either./He cheated me, wronged me. Never again” 
(9.380-386).26 The lines are in sharp contrast with Socrates’ peacefulness. 
Achilles insults the one who wronged him, emphasizes Agamemnon’s 
harm, and does what any Greek would do: harms back. He wants his 
answer to be reported publicly, so that all Greeks feel anger toward 
Agamemnon. Achilles knows that the Greeks understand justice as he does, 
and so they would agree that he is justified to be angry due to the harm he 
had received. In Achilles’ case, to harm the commander of the Greek army 
means to refuse fighting for him, and his departure for Phthia stems from 
this feeling of anger. After all, the core of the Iliad is given by Achilles’ anger, 
menis, the one that creates havoc in the Greek army and makes him desire to 
go back home. 
It is at least surprising that Plato chooses to cite the Iliad, which has 
menis at its core, after he emphasized Socrates’ calmness.27 Achilles and 
Socrates cannot be further apart, and their respective returns ‘home’ have 
radically different reasons. Socrates has not chosen his circumstances, but 
he accepts them. He did not desire to be condemned to death; however, he 
accepts his situation without being frustrated by it. Even more, he 
welcomes his return home, for which he has prepared himself, even if he 
did not cause it directly. In Achilles’s case, the return is his decision. He 
does not accept his circumstances and chooses to go back home as an 
answer to the affront he received from Agamemnon. However, despite the 
difference between these two returns, the Iliad has an important role. In 
using this verse, Plato communicates to his readers the source of the 
problem: anger. Anger clouds us and makes us believe that justice is the 
return of the equal. At the same time, he also suggests the alternative to 
anger: one can return home (perhaps to oneself) when one acts like 
Socrates. 
                                                            
26 For the Iliad, I used Homer, Iliad, transl. by S. Lombardo, Indianapolis-
Cambridge, Hackett Publishing House, 1997. 
27 In his Dialectic, Stokes points out that there are at least two reasons to consider the 
dream as a reference to death. First, “Plato’s Socrates might have thought of death as a 
return home for his soul” (p. 33). But Stokes also points out that ‘Phthia’ begins with 
‘phthi,’ “which is the root of the Greek verb φθίνω (phthínõ) meaning (though not 
commonly in classical prose) ‘die’” (ibid.). As other commentators, he also mentions (p. 
34) that Crito seems to be too preoccupied with his purpose to pay attention to Socrates’ 
dream, even if Phthia is in Thessaly, which is one of the possible refuges for Socrates (see 
45c). 
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From the beginning of the dialogue, Plato makes us aware that there 
are events in life following their course regardless of our own desire. The 
ship comes from Delos, and at its arrival Socrates must be executed. The 
ship will arrive regardless of whether Socrates’ sentence is just or not. 
Whatever comes to be, though, is not in itself bad or good news. Socrates 
only says, “may it be for the good” (43d). If so pleases the gods, so be it. 
Socrates’ passivity28 is not resignation. Socrates is not a tragic character 
defeated by destiny.29 He is not Antigone, one for whom the audience is 
invited to mourn. Instead, his passivity is beyond the distinction between 
action and passivity. When Crito comes to his cell to urge him to leave, 
Crito pushes on Socrates a dichotomy that is foreign to the philosopher – 
just as Antigone had pushed on Ismene a choice: she had to show her ‘true 
colors’. If he remains within this dichotomy, Socrates can only lose, 
regardless of his choice. If he stays in prison and accepts his death, he is a 
coward who does not fight for his life and does not take upon himself the 
responsibility to take care of his own children. If he escapes, then he is one 
who disobeys the law. In this situation, whatever decision he makes, it 
would not be a just one. Socrates makes it clear from the beginning that he 
does not live within such a dichotomy. He does not refuse talking about it, 
so he will engage Crito’s beliefs by claiming the position of the laws, but he 
shows that it does not affect him. That which is inflicted haphazardly upon 
him does not make him better or worse, wise or foolish. It just is 
irrelevant.30 
                                                            
28 This passivity may remind one of E. Levinas’ “passivity more passive than all 
passivity” in Otherwise than Being, Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 2002, p. 14. See 
also p. 92-93. 
29 See Halliwell, “Plato and Aristotle,” who discusses the repudiation of suffering in 
the Phaedo and the Republic. See also D. LaCourse Munteanu, Tragic Pathos: Pity and 
Fear in Greek Philosophy and Tragedy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012. She 
points out that “philosophers perceive ordinary desires as immoderate and ordinary fears 
as degrading reflections of ignorance, and therefore do not foster them” (p. 54). Reflecting 
on the Phaedo as well, Munteanu says that, “despite the tragic premise, […] no one ought 
to feel pity for the philosopher about to die nor should he fear his own death” (p. 57).  
30 See also G. Vlastos, Socratic Studies, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1994, p. 112. Vlastos points out that in the Crito, just as in other dialogues, Socrates shows 
that others cannot make us better or worse. Referring to 44d, Vlastos says, “The ‘greatest 
evils’ which ‘the many’ do have the power to inflict are those which involve non-moral 
goods – the deprivation of material possessions, civic status, physical life. The ‘greatest 
goods’ which they cannot confer are in the moral domain: they are impotent to make one 
morally better or worse: Socrates’ virtue is beyond the power of the ‘many’ to enhance or 
impair” (p. 112). 
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In the dialogue, Socrates is faced with an ‘Achilles surrogate’, Crito, 
who suggests that the appropriate answer when wronged is to desire to 
wrong the harming party. For Crito, it is difficult to understand why 
Socrates would not do so. It may be easy to dismiss Crito’s emotional 
reaction to a friend’s death and his inability to be faithful to his prior 
beliefs when he perceives that they no longer benefit him. However, if we 
consider how we feel when we are wronged unjustly, we may discover that 
we are often an Achilles at heart – and so we discover that we may also be 
overtaken by menis. Plato knows that anger is a powerful emotion, and he 
reminds his readers of its power when he mentions the episode with 
Achilles and his planned return to Phthia. At the same time, he also makes 
Socrates remind the confused Crito that they have often said that the right 
thing to do is to never respond with harm when harmed, but, although 
Crito seemed to have acquiesced to this view in the past, he is no longer 
able to refuse an idea of justice that is prevalent in the Greek world of the 
time. The laws have harmed Socrates and this transformed them into 
enemies. It would only be right for Socrates, in this context, to harm them 
back – and Crito is surprised that anger had not yet taken a hold of him.  
After all, Crito is very human. Just imagine that it was not he coming to 
Socrates in prison, but Antigone. Would she have a different approach? 
Wouldn’t she find Socrates’ calmness – perhaps even coldness – somewhat 
incomprehensible, even irrational? Why would Socrates accept his death 
penalty when he has been wronged by the laws? Why would he say that it is 
better to be harmed than to harm? His actions may remind Antigone of 
Ismene, her sister, who does not want to “die outside the law” (59). After all, 
Antigone may call Socrates an enemy because he disagrees with her, just as 
she rushes to call her own sister an enemy: “For God’s sake, speak out. You’ll 
be more enemy to me/If you are silent” (86-87). Such attitudes are normal 
for people who identify themselves with their own beliefs. If you attempt to 
propose a different view, they perceive this ‘disagreement’ as an attack to 
their own person, and so you become their enemies, just as Ismene could be 
for Antigone. 
In the Crito, this was precisely the problem. The harm that the laws 
have created separates the world into friends and enemies. Crito, just as 
Antigone, responds to this by changing the laws’ perspective on who the 
friends and the enemies are. Socrates has a different approach: he does not 
fight Crito’s view, but he reminds him of his previous belief, that they 
should benefit all, regardless of what others do. However, because Crito is 
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no longer able to agree, Socrates lets the Laws themselves work against 
Crito and give him reasons that he can accept.31 
Reassessment of Justice 
So far I have suggested that Plato and Sophocles show in the Crito and the 
Antigone respectively that justice as benefitting friends and harming 
enemies is pernicious. The first problem stems from the personal approach 
to justice. If two enemies believe that it is just to harm one’s enemy, they 
are both just even if they attack each other. Further, people can have 
different criteria for deciding on their friends. We see in Sophocles’ play 
that Antigone considers Polyneices a friend, while Creon punishes him as 
enemy. In Plato’s dialogue, Crito is ready to ask Socrates to disregard the 
laws because they have harmed him. Instead of clarifying criteria for action, 
justice complicates things and allows people to choose according to their 
own personal values. After all, Crito is not mistaken in believing that 
running away from prison is the just action: Socrates would stay with his 
friends and family and punish those who condemned him. Antigone is not 
unjust in attempting to bury her brother: he is her ‘friend’, and so she is 
duty-bound to do anything for him. Creon himself acts justly when he 
leaves Polyneices’s corpse for the dogs and subsequently condemns his new 
enemy, Antigone, to death. However, they all act out of what seems to be 
their own perspectives on life. 
Justice requires a belief that divides people between enemies and 
friends. But friends and enemies are personal, and so the division is also the 
result of a personal perspective on the world. This perspective is dominated 
by emotion: whenever we are harmed, we are angered, and this emotion 
pushes us to act against those we perceive to be our enemies. The Antigone 
and the Crito show this aspect of justice. The Crito goes one step further: 
the idea that someone must benefit one’s friends and harm one’s enemies 
stands only if that person believes that he can be harmed. Socrates is not 
such being. At the end of his trial, he already said that “a good man cannot 
be harmed either in life or in death” (Apol. 41d) – his attitude remains 
constant throughout Plato’s dialogues. If a good man cannot be harmed, a 
good man has no enemies, and the only thing he can do is do good to all. 
                                                            
31 See R. Weiss, Socrates Dissatisfied: An Analysis of Plato’s Crito, New York-Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1998. She correctly claims that the views of the Laws in the Crito 
are not shared by Socrates. 
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The superiority of ‘benefitting all’ to ‘benefitting your friends only and 
punishing your enemy’ is not only negative: you avoid making errors about 
friends and enemies. In fact, its superiority stems from the benefit that you 
actually receive. Your soul remains good. If Socrates’ belief that a good man 
cannot be harmed is correct, the Greek idea of justice becomes paradoxical: 
your soul must be not-good (so harmable) in order to be just. Only in this 
condition could it decide between friends and enemies. 
This aspect brings us back to mercy. For Socrates, benefitting all stems 
from goodness. Regardless of the other people’s intention to harm, a good 
soul cannot harm back. The problem we encounter, though, is that the 
only souls that can act so are those which are already good. A superhuman 
like Socrates, who sleeps peacefully a few days before his execution, has no 
need to harm others when they believe they harm him because this would 
not benefit him in any way. For him, anger does not need to be appeased; it 
is absent. What are all other mortals to do, those who are not Socrates and 
who, just like Crito, want to pay back when they are harmed even if they 
had priory agreed that one should never harm back? Should we say that a 
‘merciful’ attitude is exclusively the characteristic of an already good soul? 
Both the Antigone and the Crito seem to say so: all characters, with the 
exception of Socrates, arrive to a point where their attachment to beliefs 
leads them to fear of loss, and thus to anger and the desire to harm others. 
Even Haemon, who begins his dialogue with his father openly, ends in 
anger when he sees that his father cannot be brought on his side. The Crito 
also shows who are the people who can escape this: those who free 
themselves so much of their own opinions that they are aware that their 
opinions are of little worth. Socrates’ justice is not yet Isaac of Syria’s 
mercy: in Christianity, harm is a reality, and mercy is relevant only in the 
context of such harm. Nevertheless, we can witness in Sophocles’ Antigone 
and Plato’s Crito the birth of a new notion of justice that is keener to mercy 
than to anger because it stems from the awareness that human knowledge is 
worth nothing and from the belief that a good man cannot be harmed. 
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